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Abstract
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reviews scientifi c literature on climate change 
in an attempt to make scientifi c knowledge about climate change accessible to a wide audience 
that includes policymakers. Documents produced by the IPCC are subject to negotiations in plenary 
sessions, which can be frustrating for the scientists and government delegations involved, who all have 
stakes in getting their respective interests met. This paper draws on the work of Bruno Latour in order 
to formulate a so-called ‘diplomatic’ approach to knowledge assessment in global climate governance. 
Drawing on observations during IPCC plenaries, this paper argues that a Latourian form of diplomacy 
can lead to more inclusive negotiations in climate governance. Latour’s ideas on diplomacy help to 
identify values of parties involved with the IPCC plenaries, and allow those parties to recognize their 
mutual interests and perspectives on climate change.
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Article
Introduction: the 
Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change as a 
diplomatic arena
It is obvious, or at least it should be, that the 
governance of climate change requires knowledge 
on what this global problem is all about, and 
where solutions may be found – it is not enough 
to conclude, following Bruno Latour, that we 
have arrived in the Anthropocene and that “Gaia 
is against us” (Latour, 2013: 486). Things become 
less obvious, however, when one tries to imagine 
the best way of connecting science and politics 
around questions concerning nature, which is 
something Latour (2004) addresses. Nature is 
commonly seen as a unifying element outside of 
the human sphere. However, Latour (2004) argues 
nature is not so much a unifying fi gure, but rather 
a dividing fi gure: pluralism is concomitant with 
‘nature’, since society contains a multitude of often 
incommensurable perspectives on nature. 
2In this paper, we examine how science and 
politics become intertwined in the plenary 
sessions of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC). The IPCC is an interna-
tional body for the assessment of climate change 
that was established in 1988 by the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO). The IPCC 
produces extensive analyses of scientifi c1 research 
on climate change in 7-year cycles that culminate 
in the production of Assessment Reports. These 
documents are fi nalized during plenary sessions 
in which all countries that are member of the 
United Nations or WMO can ensure their interests 
are met, which involves elaborate diplomatic 
procedures. The plenary sessions are led by an 
elected offi  cer (in most cases the ‘Working Group 
Co-Chair’) who, besides having been nominated 
by his or her own country and having gained 
sufficient political support in larger groups of 
countries to get elected, is typically also one of the 
leading climate scientists in the world.2 
One of the most important procedural rules 
during IPCC plenaries is that delegations need 
to reach consensus in the form of a univocally 
accepted report, which includes line-by-line 
approval of the so-called Summary for Policy-
makers (SPM). This way of organizing the proceed-
ings slows things down quite a bit (it may take 
days to agree on just a couple of pages), but also 
off ers opportunities for real diplomatic encoun-
ters between the authors and the representa-
tives of countries. Not only do all of the countries 
present have to agree; the authors themselves 
also need to unanimously accept the SPM. The 
fi nal accepted report, which includes the SPM, 
serves as the benchmark for the assessment of 
climate-related risks and measures for years to 
come, so the stakes are high indeed. The scientifi c 
reputation of the co-chairs and authors are on the 
line (since any overstatements on the reliability of 
the science or any underestimation of the risk of 
climate change may backfi re later). At the same 
time, co-chairs and authors need to be fl exible 
enough to deliver a report that is found useable 
by policymakers and politicians. The latter groups 
of actors (both bureaucrats and even ministers in 
some occasions) will consider the political ‘spin’ 
they can give to the report in the media in their 
countries, and what positions can be supported 
in the context of the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Moreover, both 
groups – the scientists and the country delegates 
– are heterogeneous. Among the authors there 
are disagreements on what are the best represen-
tations of the scientifi c evidence, and among the 
countries there are clear and plain political diver-
gences, which are mostly related to assessments 
of economic impacts of either climate change 
or of proposed solutions to climate change, or 
both. Even though the meetings of IPCC plenary 
sessions are closed to the public and journalists 
are not allowed in the room, there are organiza-
tions that keep a close eye on what is happening. 
These organizations include fossil fuel organiza-
tions, environmental NGOs, and other organiza-
tions that represent diff erent interests.
The negotiations that ensue due to the partial 
compatibility of perspectives and interests can 
be likened to a prisoners’ dilemma game, where 
countries are better off  reducing their emissions 
collectively, but think they benefit more from 
continuing to emit individually. The plenary 
sessions of the IPCC involve a highly multiplicitous 
arena of voices, which somehow need to address 
climate change in unison and assess possible 
actions. As a result, plenary sessions involve an 
intense process of negotiation between numerous 
government representatives and the authors of 
IPCC reports. These negotiations involve organi-
zational, legal, political, ethical and also psycho-
logical elements, besides debate on preferred 
scientific presentations of the evidence base. 
Often, the interests of the delegations involved 
only partially overlap. Not all country delegations 
are similarly composed; some countries give the 
lead of the delegation to their nation’s meteoro-
logical office, and thereby attempt to prevent 
that political motives become visible in how 
they proceed. Ultimately, delegations operate 
according to a governmental instruction and as 
a result cannot escape from being involved with 
politics. 
The plenary sessions leading to the acceptance 
of IPCC Assessment Reports have the potential 
to create an inclusive space for negotiation by 
allowing those involved to voice their opinion. 
However, the selection of representatives features 
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3exclusivity. Governments send representatives 
in the form of delegates who are involved with 
politics in their home countries. In the case of 
the climate system and possible ‘solutions’ to the 
problem of climate change, the IPCC’s leadership 
selects representatives of scientifi c communities 
in the form of lead authors who reference scien-
tifi c publications in their respective assessment 
chapters. 
Science (through the authors) can play an 
important role as an epistemological arbiter in 
deciding what fi ndings are seen as legitimate (i.e. 
supported by the underlying scientifi c literature). 
Although science is the dominant way of speaking 
that is deployed during IPCC proceedings, authors 
who believe in ‘speaking truth to power’ by means 
of ‘objective’ scientifi c insights are often surprised 
by the other ways in which delegates speak back, 
employing other registers of ‘objectivity’. In turn, 
delegations who think they can speak power to 
science can fi nd themselves overruled by scientifi c 
consensus. Ultimately, both sides have to respect 
each other and need to reach consensus.
In this article, we relate IPCC plenaries, seen as 
settings that are replete with all kinds of relations 
(e.g., political groups, legal means, organiza-
tional frames, emotional attachments) and 
diff erent perspectives on climate change, with 
Latour’s (2002, 2011, 2013) work on Modernity 
and diplomacy, in particular his views on politics. 
Latour (1993) is renowned for arguing for the 
existence of ‘imbroglios of humans and non-
humans’ that defy comfortable categorization 
in modernist categories such as ‘Nature’ and 
‘Culture’. One need only open the newspaper, 
Latour (1993: 1 ff .) argues, to realize that science, 
politics, nature, and religion are often intertwined 
in such a way that clear-cut categories are of little 
help in understanding the world. Yet, during IPCC 
plenaries (and socio-technical controversies more 
generally) it is often Science that is mobilized as a 
universal arbiter that delivers exhaustive descrip-
tions of issues and resolves misunderstandings. 
Latour refuses to take recourse to “Nature, as 
known by Reason” (Latour, 2002: 9) to resolve 
political confl icts. Instead, Latour (2004) argues 
that Nature, as explained by the natural sciences, 
has been mobilized as a disinterested third party, 
in the (vain) hope that it could settle questions 
related to environmental governance once and 
for all.
Latourian politics involves “the progressive 
composition of the common world” (Latour, 
2002: 7). This common world cannot be taken for 
granted because it is not already constituted, and 
existing constructions may be challenged by alter-
native constructions. Diplomats play a prominent 
role in Latourian politics since they “know that 
there exists no superior referee, no arbiter able 
to declare that the other party is simply irrational 
and should be disciplined.” (Latour, 2002: 37-38) 
Latour’s idea of politics as progressive composi-
tion of the common world does not bode well 
for an approach to climate governance that relies 
primarily on science. After all, Latour (2002, 37-38) 
disagrees with the idea that objective scientifi c 
knowledge forms a universally valid arbiter that 
can resolve political conflicts once and for all. 
Thus, as we argue at greater length in section 3, 
Latour’s understanding of politics can be framed 
as a diplomatic project through and through, for 
it is diplomats who become the arbiters in the 
pluralistic political landscape he describes.
By intertwining Latour’s work on politics and 
diplomacy with our experiences as members of 
the Dutch delegation during several IPCC plenaries 
(for AP this entails 7 plenaries in the period from 
2001 until 2014; for MK two plenaries in 2014), we 
propose ways in which climate governance can be 
enriched. We argue that it is important to respect 
the diversity of political interests without losing 
appreciation of climate science. Doing so can 
help to ensure that the IPCC reports contribute 
in a meaningful manner to climate governance. 
We have observed both naivety and frustra-
tion among many authors about the political 
dimension of their IPCC work – and some have 
made pleas for getting rid of country-approved 
SPMs for that reason. In the end, however, some 
authors who were fi rst new to the process become 
aware that they are themselves doing politics, 
rallying groups of countries behind their repre-
sentation of the evidence base. We acknowledge 
that balancing science and politics can be a frus-
trating endeavor. Both delegations and authors 
may not want to fi nd their perspectives ignored, 
but the inclusion of as many diff erent perspectives 
as possible yields challenges as well. The process 
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and authors are met involves the hammering out 
of a document – where the actors are all operating 
under a multitude of organizational scripts – that 
can be accepted by all parties involved. In building 
this consensus, sacrifi ces may very well need to be 
made, which may also mean that the fi nal texts 
become a collection of generic statements that 
are vague enough to allow diff erent interpreta-
tions. Unanimous approval of the IPCC summaries 
is advantageous, since it forges documents with 
which all governments can in principle agree, also 
for use in subsequent negotiations within the UN 
climate convention (UNFCCC). The other side of 
the coin is that the documents produced become 
rather generic and unsuitable for the practice of 
climate governance. Highly sensitive issues can 
become veiled due to opaque language. Texts 
become inclusive of multiple opinions to the 
extent that they cover such a wide range of views 
on climate change that they lose specifi city and, 
as a result, applicability in the domain of climate 
governance. A possible outcome is that poli-
cymakers are unable to use IPCC reports in any 
meaningful way.
Despite the presence of a multitude of voices, 
we do not believe that the IPCC has fully realized 
its diplomatic potential in terms of bridging 
the interests concomitant with heterogeneous 
perspectives. The IPCC can be better equipped 
to do justice to this multitude of voices, provided 
diplomatic interventions along the lines that 
Latour proposes are integrated more refl exively 
in the process of producing and approving IPCC 
reports. In order to illustrate the present diffi  -
culty of such diplomatic interventions (and the 
dominance of the order of speech that many 
authors would prefer to maintain), we draw on our 
experiences during IPCC plenaries to refl ect on the 
inner workings of the IPCC. This analysis and the 
associated plea may help to improve future diplo-
matic encounters between science and politics in 
the activities of the IPCC.
Building an inclusive space of negotiation 
through diplomatic interventions aligns well 
with Bruno Latour’s (2013) notion of diplomacy 
developed in his latest book An Inquiry into 
Modes of Existence (AIME), in which Latour focuses 
on ‘diplomatic work’ across various ‘modes of 
existence’. Although this concept needs to be 
explained at greater length below, modes of 
existence can be provisionally defi ned as “diff erent 
modes of being” that “emerge historically and 
internally to specifi c cultures, rather than being a 
priori categories of the mind or the world.” (Bryant 
et al., 2011: 14) Each mode of existence has its 
own criteria for truth and is incommensurable 
with other modes. Table 1 below briefl y illustrates 
the modes we deploy in our examination of the 
IPCC in this paper. Each mode is explained briefl y 
in the table and will be explained in greater detail 
as our analysis proceeds. It should be noted that 
Latour’s (2013) AIME describes a total of 15 modes. 
We cannot do justice to the depth of Latour’s 
analysis and instead focused on those modes that 
in our view fi gured most prominently during the 
IPCC plenaries we attended. We adopt Latour’s 
notation of the various modes, which consist of a 
three letter acronym between square brackets for 
each mode3.
Diplomacy can be performed by reflexively 
doing ‘intermodal’ work that untangles confused 
ontologies and facilitates understanding between 
the adherents of various modes of existence 
(Maniglier, 2014). This intermodal work invites 
those who subscribe to a particular mode of 
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Table 1. Latourian modes used in this paper.
Mode Description
[POL] Politics, understood as an ongoing circular movement between attempts to achieve political 
representation and attempts to unsettle existing political representations.
[REF] Reference. Latour uses this mode to refer to scientifi c representations. 
[ORG] Organization, seen as the production and following of scripts.
[ATT] Attachment, a term Latour uses to refer to desires.
[MOR] Morality, understood as asking the question whether ends justify means.
[LAW] Law, understood as legal procedural connections between one step and the next.
5existence (e.g. [POL] or [REF]) to redescribe them-
selves in the light of alterity, which can establish 
and improve intermodal communication. We 
deliver a somewhat instrumental reading of 
Latour’s notion of diplomacy by arguing it can help 
to furnish the IPCC plenaries as a more inclusive 
political platform for climate governance. Our aim 
is not so much to use Latour’s notion of diplomacy 
to solve the issue of climate change per se, but 
rather for cherishing institutionalized commu-
nication between science and politics, which 
can jointly characterize the problem of climate 
change. Our guiding question in this article is 
as follows: how can Latour’s work on diplomacy 
enhance the IPCC plenaries as inclusive platforms 
for climate governance?
Methodology and paper overview
As stated above, we draw on our experiences as 
members of the delegation of the Dutch govern-
ment during several IPCC plenaries. During these 
plenary sessions, we were part of a team respon-
sible for ensuring the interests of the Netherlands 
were met during the negotiations. In this paper, we 
draw on our experiences during the IPCC plenaries 
that took place in Stockholm (September 23 to 
September 26 in 2013), Yokohama (March 25 to 
March 29 in 2014), and Copenhagen (October 27 
to October 31 in 2014). Our methodology can be 
identifi ed as the ethnographic approach of partic-
ipant observation. On a daily basis we produced a 
combined refl exive log of the proceedings during 
the plenary sessions and contact groups and of our 
own roles in these. These logs were shared with 
governmental colleagues in the Netherlands. Our 
role was far from passive, since we were an active 
part of the negotiations that led to the approval 
and acceptance of IPCC reports. We proceeded as 
follows. First, we ensured that problems with the 
draft text of the IPCC report that were fl agged 
by a team of specialists in the Netherlands were 
addressed during the IPCC plenaries. Second, 
close collaboration with others in the Dutch 
government led to sets of instructions tailored to 
each plenary session that needed to be followed 
through. As a result, the instructions acted as a 
script by shaping how we conducted ourselves 
in the mode of organization [ORG]. Awareness of 
the Dutch political context also went into these 
scripts [POL]4. Third, we ensured collaborations 
and interventions were planned and executed 
when necessary.
Although we were very much part of the 
processes of negotiation between incompatible 
perspectives we describe in the following, we do 
not think this implies an insurmountable bias in 
our view of the IPCC. Rather, by articulating our 
own approach to these negotiations, we demystify 
our own preoccupations and actions in an attempt 
to make them transparent to the reader. Thus, our 
writing can be framed as an attempt to demon-
strate the diplomatic interventions Latour (2013) 
discusses, which involve a process of allowing 
adherents of modes of existence (including, but 
not limited to scientifi c practitioners and policy-
makers ranging from bureaucrats and professional 
diplomats to ministers) to express themselves 
in their own terms, whilst respecting other 
modes and ensuring that negotiation among the 
diff erent modes is enabled and fostered. 
In relating Latour’s work on diplomacy with 
the practices of the IPCC, we proceed as follows. 
The following section briefl y illustrates concepts 
from Latour’s (2013) work related to politics and 
diplomacy, and subsequently refi nes the notion of 
diplomacy as further developed in AIME. Subse-
quently, we move on to two examples from IPCC 
plenaries: a discussion on climate sensitivity and 
confl ict pertaining to an ‘infographic’ on climate 
impacts. We follow up on these examples by 
discussing Latour’s more recent work (Latour et 
al. 2011; Latour 2013) on political representation 
and propose ways to refurbish the IPCC plenaries 
as more inclusive platforms for political delib-
eration on climate governance. We conclude the 
paper by proposing ways in which Latour’s ideas 
on diplomacy and political representation could 
be implemented more refl exively in the organiza-
tion of the IPCC, instead of the non-refl exive way 
in which diplomacy has been done in the IPCC 
until now. 
Latourian politics and diplomacy
Throughout his work, Latour abstains from the 
idea that scientific knowledge can be based 
on an objective and accurate representation 
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available to be known. For example, Latour 
(1993, 1999) argues that only the study of scien-
tifi c practices can explain how scientists attribute 
objectivity, accuracy, reliability, and truth to scien-
tifi c knowledge. The work and maintenance that 
make up scientifi c knowledge can be explained by 
an analysis of networks of human and non-human 
‘actants’, and the ways in which these actants are 
brought together and change through a process 
that Latour describes as ‘translation’, which refers 
to “the work through which actors, modify, 
displace, and translate their various and contra-
dictory interests” (Latour, 1999: 311). Translation 
produces actor networks that are hidden from 
view in a process identifi ed as ‘purifi cation’, which 
implies scientifi c theories are detached from their 
history, obtain the status of ‘objective’ represen-
tations of nature, and are granted the ability to 
speak on behalf of nature. 
Thus, Latour (1993) studies scientifi c practices 
with the aim of supplanting epistemological 
assumptions pertaining to objectivity with the 
articulation of the multiple heterogeneous actants 
that make up actor networks. This analysis extends 
beyond scientifi c knowledge. Latour rejects the 
modernist dualism of mechanical nature versus 
society constructed ex nihilo, and argues there 
is no such thing as an a priori society. Modern 
conceptions of the world rely on strict bifurcations 
between Man, Nature, Mind, and Matter. As argued 
above in the introduction, Latour points to the 
existence of imbroglios of human and non-human 
actants that ultimately compose what we come to 
call ‘society’. This rejection of a pre-given Society 
has repercussions for Latour’s conceptualization 
of politics. Graham Harman (2014) argues that 
Latourian politics cannot be based on an idea of 
a state of nature, which obstructs the idea that 
a particular society or politics can correspond 
with or deviate from this state of nature. Society 
persists through translation and can neither be 
grounded “in natural right or in an unquestion-
able sovereign authority”, nor can it be based on 
the idea of a “natural human equality or the irre-
ducible character of diversity in a world devoid of 
absolute truth” (Harman, 2014: 30). Political truths 
are provisional and are composed of networks 
that are forged by the most powerful actants.
 In his later work, Latour (2011, 2013) no longer 
wishes to reduce all actors to the same ontological 
footing, and instead emphasizes the distinctions 
between various ‘modes’ of being and empha-
sizes the plurality of worldviews that, taken 
together, compose the world we live in. Diff erent 
domains (e.g. science, law, and economics) imply 
diff erent ontologies, or (combinations of ) ‘modes 
of existence’. Drawing on terms from semiotics, 
Latour compares the notion of mode of existence 
with ‘regimes of enunciation’, which 
set up what comes next without impinging in the 
least on what is actually said. 
Like a musical score, the regime merely indicates 
the tonality, the key in which one must prepare to 
play the next part. So this is not about looking for 
what is underneath the statements, their condition 
of possibility, or their foundations, but a thing that 
is light but also decisive: their mode of existence. It 
tells us ‘what to do next’. (Latour, 2011: 309.)
There is no knowing object or knowing subject a 
priori to a mode of existence. Rather than being 
pre-existing categories, modes of existence 
emerge from historically and culturally specifi c 
sites. 
In a world populated by various modes of 
existence, metaphysicians are involved with 
diplomatic work across diff erent modes, eff ec-
tively furnishing intercultural work through which 
confused ontologies can be untangled and under-
standing between various social groups can be 
reached (Maniglier, 2014). AIME aligns well with 
the increasingly wide-spread realization that 
modernist facts and values, such as Mind and 
“the institution of matter” (Latour, 2013: 118), are 
running out of steam and need to be re-envisioned 
as values rather than objective facts, especially vis 
à vis present-day ecological crises. The process of 
untangling the Modern constitution is referred 
to as ‘ecologizing modernity’, which requires 
the constitution of a “whole new diplomacy” 
(Latour, 2013: 103) that is able to accommodate 
diff erent modes of existence. Articulating modes 
of existence involves ontology, seen as an inquiry 
into the existence of things, as well as studying the 
relations these things entertain and the behaviors 
and values they exhibit. Seen in this way, ontology 
is ecology.
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a plurality of modes of existence. Latour (2002) 
explains diplomacy as a way to furnish ‘multi-
naturalism’, where diff erent values form a unity 
as “the end result of a diplomatic eff ort” (Latour, 
2002: 3). Diplomats are invited to let go of grand 
modern categories like Science, whilst retaining 
the power of the sciences (Latour, 2002: 45) and 
letting negotiations between diff erent perspec-
tives “resume in earnest” (Latour, 2002: 48). This 
approach to diplomacy aligns well with Latour’s 
work in AIME, which entails the following ideas 
about diplomacy:
The present investigation is presented as a 
diplomatic enterprise in the sense that there is no 
outside arbiter – survival of the fi ttest, universal 
reason, state, law, laws of nature etc. In this case, 
for want of a “referee” acceptable to all, we must 
“retake language” and, with the aid of a minimal 
number of forms, organize identifi cation and bring 
negotiable and non-negotiable positions into 
contact with each other. It is because the common 
world needs to be composed that we must have 
recourse to a diplomatic procedure. (Latour, 2014)
The introduction of AIME (Latour, 2013: 2-6) 
contains an anecdote of a scientist who takes 
recourse to an explanation that illustrates the 
diplomatic character of AIME. Latour alludes to 
a climate scientist who is criticized by a climate 
skeptic. Rather than taking recourse to science’s 
potential to acquire objective and reliable 
knowledge, the climate scientist does not invoke 
a presupposed epistemic process of Science 
to defend his claims. Instead, he goes on to list 
the various means through which a scientific 
understanding of climate change is produced. 
Speaking in terms of Latour’s own Actor Network 
Theory (ANT), the scientist in question maps out 
the various elements of the network in which 
he himself is enrolled. This imbroglio of objects, 
agencies, and institutions has the ability to manu-
facture ‘objective’ knowledge. Latour not only 
delights in the description of science thus given, 
but also thinks this is the right way forward for 
the climate scientist. Retaining the power of the 
sciences involves articulating the ‘chains of trans-
lation’ (Latour, 1999: 91ff .) that make up scientifi c 
knowledge. Constructivist analyses of the sciences 
reframe scientific practice and could lead to 
“opening the peace talks again by rephrasing the 
war aims of all parties” (Latour, 2002: 41).
Such a constructivist exposition of chains of 
translation in climate science is also important 
due to the plurality of voices that can be found in 
the author teams responsible for writing the IPCC 
reports. The IPCC bases its reports on substan-
tial reviews of scientifi c publications and is not 
involved with doing research itself. Although the 
authors need to base their fi ndings on scientifi c 
publications that discuss various aspects of climate 
change, they often end up having diverging inter-
pretations. As a result, diff erent perspectives on 
climate change need to be condensed into an 
‘objective’ representation of the current state of 
climate science. For this reason, it is important 
that the IPCC acknowledges the role of expert 
judgment. Thus, the scientifi c underpinning of 
the IPCC’s fi ndings is made amenable for contes-
tation if deemed necessary. A further example of 
this is the development and implementation of 
criteria to assess the quality of scientifi c fi ndings 
by using ‘uncertainty’ qualifi ers, which enhances 
the transparency of IPCC documents by exposing 
the chains of reference and the underlying scien-
tifi c processes. Those involved acquire the possi-
bility to understand how the scientifi c basis of the 
IPCC’s fi ndings was established. 
Latour’s proposal to expose the chains of trans-
lation of science does not mean that he thinks 
the values of the Moderns simply need to be 
abandoned. If ‘we have never been modern’, as 
Latour (1993) has stated, the question is to ask 
what we have been instead. AIME emerges as a 
positive version of Latour’s earlier diagnosis of 
the Moderns. Rather than rejecting the values of 
the Moderns outright, the diplomatic task at hand 
here is to understand the experience and modes 
peculiar to the Moderns. The diplomat enables the 
Moderns to speak out for their own values in a way 
that fosters negotiation with other modes. It is the 
task of the diplomat to help the various parties in 
a confl ict fi nd out what it is they are fi ghting for 
(Latour, 2002: 50). The perspectives of all involved 
are approached in a ‘respectful’ manner. Put diff er-
ently, it is important not to reduce the perspec-
tive of one practitioner to that of another, e.g. 
by reducing one practice to another by arguing 
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reducing diff erences to an irreducible opposition, 
e.g. by radically opposing science with politics or 
religion. 
Diplomacy involves identifying the diff erent 
‘interpretive keys’ (Latour, 2013: 319) that belong 
to diff erent modes of existence and making sure 
that category mistakes are avoided: “the rational 
degenerates into parasitic rationalization as soon 
as we lose or confuse the keys” (Latour, 2013: 319). 
Diplomacy involves “a practical relationalism that 
seeks, in a protocol of relationship-building and 
benchmarking, to avoid the ravages of relativism 
– that absolutism of a single point of view” (Latour, 
2013: 481). In other words, Latour’s diplomacy 
is a plea for a pluriverse that accommodates a 
multiplicity of modes of existence. The fi gure of 
the diplomat, “as devious as he is naïve” (Latour, 
2013: 484), plays an important role. Constructing a 
more accommodating pluriverse does not involve 
bringing down existing institutions, but rather the 
accommodation of diff erent modes of existence: 
“[w]hat we want is an institution that follows the 
trajectory of its own mode of existence without 
prejudging the rest, without insulting the others” 
(Latour, 2013: 482).
As we show below, diplomacy helps to foster 
a more inclusive form of climate governance, 
e.g. by better accommodating the interests of all 
involved. We provide two examples of diplomacy 
in action. In each case, we outline the perspec-
tives and actions of those involved, and perform 
a diplomatic analysis ourselves, i.e. by attempting 
to untangle confused modes of existence. In 
addition, we explain how diplomatic interven-
tions along the lines proposed by Latour could 
inform the negotiations during IPCC plenaries. As 
a result, diplomacy could have helped to establish 
a more inclusive and refl exive space of negotia-
tion in which the perspectives of those involved 
are accommodated, ensuring the possibility of 
seeking acceptable compromises. 
Diplomacy in action 1: 
climate sensitivity
Our fi rst example of diplomacy in action discusses 
events on the last day of plenary approval session 
for the Working Group I contribution to the IPCC’s 
Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) in Stockholm 
(Thursday 26 September 2013). Working Group I 
addresses natural science questions pertaining to 
the climate system: e.g. how much warming do 
the greenhouse gases that are emitted by human 
activity cause? The negotiations in this example 
of diplomacy in action concern the politically and 
scientifically sensitive issue of the ‘equilibrium 
climate sensitivity’, which is a theoretical quantity 
that represents how much the Earth would warm 
up in the long run from a doubling of the carbon 
dioxide concentration relative to the pre-indus-
trial era. For many decades the estimates for this 
quantity have ranged between 1.5°C and 4.5°C. 
Given that the world had already decided to 
keep the temperature below 2°C, this theoretical 
quantity, an in particular its uncertainty, could 
be regarded as politically relevant in the climate 
negotiations: when the climate sensitivity is high 
the greenhouse gas emissions will have to be 
reduced further to keep the temperature below 
2°C than when the sensitivity is low.
This issue was sensitive in Stockholm even more 
since it had already been in the news (through 
‘leaks’) that the range of the ‘climate sensitivity’ 
compared to the previous IPCC report (AR4, 2007) 
was to be adjusted. Because of new studies, the 
lower bound had gone down to 1.5°C, while it 
had temporarily (since 2007) sat at 2°C. Politically, 
some countries wanted to highlight that climate 
may be less sensitive to greenhouse gas emissions, 
while other countries could not stomach the 
emphasis on the (lowered) low scenario – they 
wanted to retain emphasis on the (unchanged) 
high scenario. Scientifi cally, more references had 
become available based on a particular type of 
estimation methods (which gave lower climate 
sensitivity outcomes). Eff ectively, the narrative of 
the authors in the construction of the new climate 
sensitivity range had changed from the narrative 
of six years earlier. This is nothing to be embar-
rassed about: every round the evidence base has 
evolved and every round the authors are asked to 
give their best expert judgment.
 In the plenary session the authors proposed to 
delete the following sentence from the summary:
The lower temperature limit of the assessed likely 
range is thus less than the 2°C in the AR4.
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9The suggestion to omit this sentence was 
based on the argument that the ranges between 
the subsequent reports were incomparable due 
to diff erences in methodology. According to the 
authors, the way chains of reference were built 
up were diff erent from one report to the next 
[REF]. Some countries objected: they claimed that 
policy-relevant information would then disappear 
from the summary and they could not accept that. 
For them, deletion of this sentence would make 
it more diffi  cult to politically rally groups around 
the claim that climate change could be less 
severe than was expected earlier [POL], although 
they could not admit this so openly in the IPCC 
proceedings. Subsequently, after the plenary 
meeting could not reach an agreement, one of 
us (AP) found himself later that morning around 
a standing table in an informal consultation 
group on the climate sensitivity text. The repre-
sentatives of a number of countries had been sent 
out of the session to negotiate with each other 
and with the authors. There were countries that 
found it important that a comparison was made 
with AR4 and there were countries against doing 
this. There was a mix of reasons and motivations, 
clearly at the crossing of the modes of reference 
[REF] and politics [POL], but also uncertainty 
guidelines [ORG] and emotional attachments 
[ATT] of both country delegates and authors were 
thrown into the mix (including AP’s own, who 
had strong views on how uncertainties had to be 
addressed and was highly driven to obtain closure 
on this matter). These negotiations took place in 
a ‘pressure cooker’, since the chair of the session 
wanted to have results quickly. 
The initial proponents of keeping the elimi-
nated sentence found it very relevant for their 
policy-makers to show that the lower limit has 
been reduced – and stated so. Opponents used 
two arguments to defend the deletion: (1) by 
highlighting just the lowering of the lower 
bound one ignored that the upper bound had 
remained the same, and for many policy-makers 
the upper bound was at least as important as 
the lower bound; (2) the methodologies diff ered 
between AR4 and AR5, so that the range would be 
incomparable. Having heard all this, the authors 
together produced a new draft text, in which they 
went along with the opponents, picking up on 
their second argument. However, in this way they 
did not get their politics right. The authors were 
wrong to assume that that argument would sway 
the initial proponents of keeping the eliminated 
sentence (and AP thought, that the argument was 
not sound anyway).
AP saw all of this happen and concluded that 
they were not going to converge in this way. He 
realized that a compromise was possible along the 
line of the fi rst argument of the opponents. For a 
moment, this compromise had been on the table 
as an acceptable option for important proponents 
and opponents: refer to both the reduction of the 
lower bound and the unchanged upper bound. 
This should be easy! But the authors had by now 
been put entirely on the wrong track, so he would 
have to make a very solid intervention, against 
the authors and against a powerful country. And 
he had to speak to the authors in terms of under-
pinning [REF] after he had spoken to the country 
most strongly pushing for the phrase on the 
lowering of the lower limit in terms of interests 
[POL]. So he asked the authors fi rst to confi rm that 
AR4 and AR5 ranges, although they have been 
established in diff erent ways, are indeed similar 
in that they both represent an expert judgment 
with a similar degree of likelihood. They could not 
deny it, and reluctantly they confi rmed it. Then he 
scored his goal: this meant that the argument that 
the ranges were not methodologically compa-
rable was invalid, and that nothing stood in the 
way for the authors to include upper and lower 
bounds for both AR4 and AR5. He also mentioned 
that this compromise was already at hand and 
strongly urged the countries to now agree with 
it. This diplomatic intervention struck the right 
keys both scientifi cally and politically, eff ectively 
prevented a further dynamic and led to conver-
gence within the next 5 minutes. They could all 
go back to the plenary hall, where the session was 
slowly but surely on the way to the fi nish line. A 
little later the following phrase came along: “The 
lower temperature limit of the assessed likely 
range is thus less than the 2°C in the AR4, but 
the upper limit is the same”. No country had any 
further comments and the text was approved.
Kouw & Petersen
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Diplomacy in action 2: 
representing climate impacts
As illustrated above, the intended outcome of 
each plenary session of the IPCC is a policy-rele-
vant document that addresses climate change 
in a topical manner, is adopted by all countries 
involved, and acts as an international benchmark 
for subsequent research on climate change and 
climate-related policymaking. In practice, this 
means that agreements are established through 
negotiations where diverging interests meet and 
agreements can be produced, often in the form of 
compromises. Here we give a second example of 
such a process of negotiation, this one featuring 
diverging perspectives on an information graphic, 
or ‘infographic’. Even though these negotiations 
featured only partially compatible interests, 
the parties involved did eventually reach an 
agreement. 
During the plenary session of the Synthesis 
Report, the fi gure below (Figure 1) was presented 
for consideration to the countries present. The 
fi gure locates observed impacts of climate change 
at geographical locations. The impacts in question 
can be attributed to climate change with varying 
levels of confi dence (see the explanation of attri-
bution in the lower-left corner). Attribution turned 
out to be the subject of much debate. Impacts 
that cannot be attributed to climate change in a 
‘scientifi cally acceptable’ manner (i.e. being up 
to par with the scientific standards upheld by 
the IPCC) are not included in the fi gure [REF]. 
Several countries from Africa, Latin America and 
South America proposed to customize and even 
remove the fi gure, since they observed large gaps 
between the figure and ‘reality’: for them the 
impression conveyed by the fi gure was politically 
hard to swallow [POL]. One delegation remarked 
that the fi gure was also representative of diff er-
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 Figure 1. Figure SPM.2A (IPCC, 2014a: 7) showing observed impacts that can be attributed to climate change for 
physical, biological, human, and managed systems. As discussed in the text, this map was the subject of a heavy 
debate.
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ences in the availability of funds for scientific 
research: since developed countries had more 
resources to do research on the extent to which 
impacts can be attributed to climate change, this 
also led to a higher chance of successful attribu-
tions of impacts to climate change and a larger 
number of attributed impacts included on the 
fi gure. This should accordingly lead the IPCC to 
have moral scruples over this fi gure [MOR]: in the 
poor countries the impacts of climate change are 
expected to have more negative eff ects but they 
are at the same time less well known because they 
are less studied, which could be seen as a ‘perver-
sity’ indeed.
 These concerns, coming from other modes of 
existence, were understandable to many delegates 
(including MK), because the fi gure represented an 
extremely important aspect of climate govern-
ance, namely the extent to which climate change 
already had a negative impact. Although attribu-
tion was addressed in the caption of the fi gure, it 
was conceivable that a fi gure like this would take 
on a life of its own. As Latour (1986: 19) points out, 
“[t]here is nothing you can dominate as easily as a 
fl at surface”. It would probably be widely shared, 
and the subtleties behind ‘attribution’ might not 
be taken into account. Rather, the fi gure was likely 
to act as an exhaustive representation, which 
would also be due to the perceived authority of 
the IPCC. 
But the authors were at fi rst not open for a 
diplomatic exchange. They kept repeating that 
attribution of observed impacts had to be based 
on available scientific literature, which was 
evaluated on the basis of scientifi c criteria and 
guidance upheld by the IPCC, implying a ‘crossing’ 
of [REF] and [ORG], which Latour writes as [REF 
• ORG]5. A crossing of modes joins modes that 
have diff erent eff ects. In this case, representation 
on the basis of scientifi c criteria [REF] is combined 
with the IPCC’s procedural requirements [ORG], 
yielding an obdurate mixture of knowledge 
deemed scientifically sound that also aligned 
correctly with the IPCC’s procedural criteria. The 
authors of the fi gure stressed that their work had 
already been approved during the Working Group 
II session of the IPCC in Yokohama in March 2014 
[LAW]. According to its authors, the fi gure consti-
tuted a “major advancement” and was repre-
sentative of global impacts that could be reliably 
attributed to climate change. This information was 
meant to provide a scientifi c basis to advocate for 
adaptation and mitigation. In addition, the fi gure 
also provided insight into topics that needed to be 
studied more extensively, and the geographical 
areas where more work on the impact of climate 
change needed to be done. In other words, the 
fi gure had an illustrative role, but also an epistemic 
one as an articulation of knowledge gaps.
One delegation proposed to update the 
caption of the fi gure by adding a sentence stating 
that an impact missing on the map did not mean 
that this impact in question has nothing to do 
with climate change. After more negotiations, the 
following caption was proposed:
Figure SPM.4: Widespread impacts in a changing 
climate: Based on studies since the AR4, global 
patterns of impacts in recent decades attributed 
to climate change. Symbols indicate categories 
of attributed impacts, the relative contribution of 
climate change (major or minor) to the observed 
impact, and confi dence in attribution. Locations 
without symbols may be aff ected by climate 
change impacts that have not yet been detected 
and attributed to climate change. See WGII SPM 
Table SPM.A1 for descriptions of the impacts.
Apparently, the authors had started to engage 
with the image in a diplomatic manner. Still, the 
aforementioned explanation and proposed cap-
tion did not appear to advance the discussion. 
One group of delegations emphasized the impor-
tance of displaying only impacts that could be 
legitimately attributed to climate change. Others 
stressed that the average policymaker would lit-
erally see the fi gure as a truthful representation 
of impacts of climate change. In short, one group 
emphasized the quality of the scientifi c process 
that led to the fi gure [REF], the other group rea-
soned from the perspective of policymakers and 
politicians and how they could mobilize groups 
using the fi gure [POL]. Once again, the authors 
retorted that there was political relevance of keep-
ing the fi gure as it was: via the scientifi c process 
underlying the fi gure it had been possible to con-
vey the fact that there are indeed global impacts 
that can be attributed to climate change [REF], 
and that climate change is no longer a hypotheti-
Kouw & Petersen
12
cal problem and needs to be treated as a political 
issue [POL]. 
The day after the foregoing events transpired, 
an agreement was reached in the form of a new 
fi gure (Figure 2). Due to the political sensitivity 
of the fi gure and the resistance encountered by 
its authors, a diff erent design was chosen as an 
alternative. The map no longer actually func-
tioned as a map, but rather as a collection of 
icons that represented observed impacts, which 
were displayed in a box that had the continent 
in question as a backdrop. However, the actual 
location of the observed impacts was now no 
longer represented. The new design coupled 
observed impacts to entire continents, causing 
the observed impacts to lose geographical speci-
fi city. In other words, whereas the previous fi gure 
allowed the coupling of an observed impact to 
a specifi c region, the new fi gure was more like a 
collection of impacts. The graphical representa-
tion of the continents had become a background, 
and now only provided general information about 
the location of observed impacts. Thus, content 
present in the previous version of the fi gure – the 
explicit information about the geographic speci-
fi city of observed impacts – was now (literally) 
wiped off  the map: in the new chain of reference 
some information that was included in the 
previous version was lost [REF]. That being said, 
the new fi gure included a hint on the moral issue 
identified the day before: the numbers at the 
bottom of the boxes of each continent indicated 
the number of references on which the attribu-
tion of observed impacts for that continent was 
based (itself a measure for how many studies had 
actually been done). This proposal constituted an 
acceptable compromise for the plenary, but it had 
not come easily from the side of the authors.
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Figure 2. Figure SPM.4 (IPCC 2014b, 7) showing impacts that can be attributed to climate change according to 
scientifi c criteria established by the IPCC, as discussed during the fi nalization of the Synthesis Report.
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MK with hindsight saw the proceedings 
around these fi gures as a lost opportunity. The 
density of information appear to be rather large 
and the boundaries of the paper format appear 
to have been reached. Although more and more 
voices within the IPCC had argued that diff erent 
platforms and formats for dissemination needed 
to be explored, this was not the case during the 
foregoing negotiations. In the end, the question 
is whether the present form of the infographic 
suffices. The authors of the infographic were 
forced to implement a diff erent design that no 
longer articulated the blind spots of research 
on climate impacts geographically on the map 
(although they did show up in the numbers in 
the lists). The interests of the various government 
representatives who contested the initial design 
had acquired a more ‘balanced’ representation of 
climate impacts, but one that lacked important 
geographical information: such information on 
attribution could have been mobilized in order to 
plea for additional research on climate impacts in 
specifi c geographical regions. 
It appears that the clash between [POL] and 
[REF] here had created a compromise with poten-
tially profound repercussions. Neither group had 
emerged victorious and there was relatively little 
understanding among the opposing country 
delegates for the intentions of the authors of the 
infographic. [POL] had impinged quite radically 
on the process of representing climate impacts. 
The political circle
As became clear in the foregoing, delegations 
partaking in the IPCC plenaries attempt to have 
their interests met, which entails the consolida-
tion of a multitude of voices due to the diff erent 
and often incompatible agendas of the delega-
tions and authors involved. Although diplomacy 
can be of benefi t in terms of articulating values 
and building consensus between diff erent dele-
gations and with authors, it is not a silver bullet 
that will always yield a solution. Delegations may 
fi nd their interests unaddressed and the authors 
of IPCC reports may fi nd that their hard work on 
climate science is not taken up in the political 
process that is also involved in approving a 
report’s summary. However, as we show in this 
section, Latourian diplomacy is a crucial building 
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block for a more inclusive and accommodating – 
and more refl exive – form of climate governance. 
To bring home this claim, we need to explore 
[POL] in more detail, the mode of existence with 
which many IPCC authors could engage more 
productively.
[POL] should not be confused with [REF], 
since this would feed into disillusionment in the 
form of a belief in ‘rational politics’. This techno-
cratic form of politics [POL • REF] leans heavily on 
positivistic science, and assumes scientists ‘speak 
truth to power’ by feeding scientifi c fi ndings into 
the process of policymaking. The implication of 
rational politics is that scientifi c knowledge can 
simply be taken up as is, without any mediation. 
However, there is no such thing as knowledge or 
truth without mediation in a Latourian ontology: 
“[d]emanding that scientists tell the truth directly, 
with no laboratory, no instruments, no equipment, 
no processing of data, no writing of articles, no 
conferences or debates ... without stammering [or] 
babbling, would be senseless” (Latour, 2003: 147 
quoted in Harman, 2014: 83). The IPCC’s relation-
ship with science, expressed in the often-encoun-
tered dictum “policy relevant but policy neutral”, is 
unable to account for the processes of mediation 
that take place once scientifi c knowledge needs 
to be taken up by policymakers.
Like the other modes, [POL] has its own felicity 
conditions involving language and action that 
unifi es internally confl icting and disparate ‘multi-
tudes’, or masses of people. For Latour, [POL] 
entails a cycle from multitude to political repre-
sentation that is never-ending and inherently 
disappointing: some voices are amplifi ed whilst 
others are drowned out in the tumultuous uproar 
of the agora. Political representation involves the 
articulation of a position, but once this position 
is articulated and achieves political represen-
tation, other positions are excluded. The cycle 
from multitude to representation may lead to the 
dissolving of representation due to the concerns 
of a multitude that feels its concerns are insuffi  -
ciently represented: “the ruler inevitably betrays 
the ruled and the ruled betrays the ruler in turn, 
through a series of translations or remixes of what 
one seems to tell the other” (Harman, 2014: 86). As 
a result, the cycle from multitude to representation 
will begin again, starting from a new and changed 
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multitude that once again attempts to construct 
political representation. There is no way in which 
the concerns of a particular multitude can simply 
be fed into politics. Believing the contrary would 
ignore the necessity of mediation, much like the 
aforementioned belief in rational politics. 
Taking very specifi c and fi xed political moti-
vations as a starting point in negotiations will 
most likely frustrate political deliberation: those 
who demand their interests are met ‘as is’ are 
eff ectively doomed to disappointment, since any 
compromise will be framed as betrayal. The devel-
opment of political representation is profoundly 
vulnerable: the political circle “can at any moment 
grow larger by multiplying inclusions, or shrink by 
multiplying exclusions. Everything depends on its 
renewal, on the courage of those who, all along 
the chain, agree to behave in such a way that 
their behavior leads to the next part of the curve” 
(Latour, 2013: 342, original emphasis). The renewal 
of the political circle can establish a situation in 
which the renewal of the political circle is less 
painful or frustrating, though it might as well “take 
a turn for the worse” (Latour, 2013: 343). 
In Latour’s multiverse that is populated by 
adherents to various modes of existence, Nature is 
not so much a universally valid and unambiguous 
arbiter against which the value of other perspec-
tives can be weighed, but rather a dividing fi gure. 
These insights can be extended to the IPCC 
plenaries, which rely on the natural, economic 
and social sciences, and the humanities,6 without 
those sciences having the power to unify the 
planet – they are not the ultimate epistemological 
arbiter that can settle confl icts once and for all, 
but modes among other modes. The IPCC may act 
as if there were such a fi nal way to resolve confl icts 
between these modes, e.g. by heralding global 
climate models as impartial instruments that have 
the strongest voice in debates on climate change, 
but this ultimately entails a category mistake. 
In those cases where [REF], or any other mode, 
is hailed as a superior mode that will function 
as a universally valid arbiter to settle debates is 
where diplomacy will prove most of its value, i.e. 
by ensuring that adherents of particular modes 
articulate why they subscribe to a particular idea, 
and subsequently trying as best as possible to 
accommodate these diff erent perspectives in the 
fi nal outcome of IPCC plenaries. As argued above, 
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[POL] is inherently disappointing, but is also 
‘experimental’ in the sense that it refuses to settle 
on a particular way of doing politics: “[politics is] 
experimental because if we have to begin to agree 
on the basic furniture of the world … then politics 
is certainly fi nished, because there is actually no 
way we will settle these questions” (Latour et 
al., 2011: 46). As our examples of diplomacy in 
action show, pluralism is a prominent part of IPCC 
plenaries. If the IPCC plenaries fail to accommo-
date this plurality of perspectives, the political 
circle is likely to frustrate, for example by estab-
lishing a strict form of rational politics in which 
[REF] is the mode of choice. Diplomacy would 
go a long way into making sure other modes are 
accommodated. 
That being said, there are important ways 
in which diplomatic work can be supported by 
the institutional setting of the IPCC. Pleas to use 
diff erent ways to frame the challenge of climate 
change have sounded both within and outside 
of the IPCC, where diff erent authors question the 
ability of the IPCC reports to make an impact on 
policymaking. Tendentious reporting on climate 
science, for example during the ‘Climategate’ aff air 
in 2009, during which e-mail communication of 
climate scientists working on IPCC reports became 
the subject of widespread criticism, in combina-
tion with more acute fi nancial and geopolitical 
crises, obstructs the ability of scientists and policy-
makers to make climate change a matter of more 
general concern (Pielke, 2005; Marquart-Pyatt 
et al., 2011). There are also calls for institutional 
renewal within the IPCC. It has been pleaded for 
instance by AP, also in a session with delegates, 
that reforms are needed in order to improve 
the way data and fi ndings are used by actors at 
national and subnational levels. This can be done 
through continuous assessment and monitoring 
of what needs to be done when and where, alter-
native reporting mechanisms and novel forms of 
output, producing more special reports in collab-
oration with other organizations, engaging user 
communities in the production of climate assess-
ments, and sharing resources to enhance the 
participation of developing countries (Petersen et 
al., 2015). Organizational reform could lead to the 
IPCC becoming more inclusive and better adapted 
to the requirements of particular contexts. More 
attention could be paid to cross-cutting and more 
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local issues, which could lead to the involvement 
of transnational organizations, multinationals, 
NGOs representing other non-national issues, 
and scientific organizations cutting through 
borders. Thus, one could argue, IPCC plenaries 
would shift from serving the self-interest of indi-
vidual states to a diff erent territorial attachment, 
eff ectively enacting new geopolitical frames of 
climate change. But it remains to be seen how far 
diplomacy can go to make this a reality.
Conclusion: invoking the political 
circle, again and again
What to make of the role of the diplomat after all 
of this? Latour (2004) draws inspiration from the 
work of Carl Schmitt, for whom the condition of 
war is defi ned by the absence of an indisputable 
arbiter who would be able to settle the confl ict 
once and for all. In this context, the diplomat never 
uses ”the notion of a common world of reference, 
since it is to construct that common world that 
he confronts all the dangers ... [h]e swallows his 
pride” (Latour, 2004: 212-213). Diplomacy may be 
experienced as a form of betrayal, as it involves 
the “[s]kill that makes it possible to get off  a war 
footing by pursuing the experiment of the collec-
tive concerning the common world by modifying 
its essential requirements” (Latour, 2004: 240, 
emphasis added). In other words, the diplomat 
attempts to create new collectives by asking 
what can be given up in order to create such new 
collectives. 
It is the work of the diplomat that can both 
enrich and frustrate the political circle. Diplomacy 
is a two-sided phenomenon: the betrayal that 
accompanies diplomatic intervention could lead 
to the exclusion of modes of existence, but may 
also lead to a renewed iteration of the political 
circle by taking up the challenge of articulating 
new collectives. Since so much hinges on the 
diplomat, a reasonable question is where he 
or she will come from, and what institutional 
setting will provide space to diplomatic inter-
ventions. Our suggestions concerning the latter 
matter provided in the previous section are only 
a modest beginning for such considerations. Let 
us end on a more positive note: the IPCC provides 
a fertile institutional setting for the exploration of 
such questions.
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Diplomatic interventions have the potential to 
yield a more versatile and accommodating organ-
ization of the IPCC and its plenaries. Invoking 
the political circle again and again is a daunting 
prospect in terms of organizing, administrating, 
and maintaining the fl exible political infrastruc-
ture that a more experimental Latourian politics 
entails. However, a more versatile and accommo-
dating IPCC will help to address environmental 
challenges. It is not always possible for [REF] 
to be the preferred mode to settle debates in 
climate governance once and for all, which our 
case studies illustrate. Diplomatic intervention 
will position [REF] as a mode among modes, and 
will thereby inform the tremendous challenge of 
addressing climate change on a scale that truly 
encompasses global interests. 
It is our expectation that Latour’s diplomatic 
project can inspire the intermodal work described 
above. Thus, an inclusive space for environmental 
governance can be furnished without the presup-
position of forms of politics that reach consensus. 
Rather, a more productive stance is to see politics 
as an interplay of forces, which may yield results 
that may very well be to the chagrin of those 
involved and society more generally. Latour’s 
diplomatic project stresses the importance of 
taking up the struggle for political representa-
tion again and again, whilst acknowledging the 
struggle that this will entail. Even then, diplomats 
cannot provide an easy fix. As Latour himself 
admits: “As always, the parties in the confl ict do 
not know exactly what they are fi ghting for. The 
task of the diplomats is to help them fi nd out. And, 
of course, their off er of mediation, like mine, may 
fail” (Latour, 2002: 50-51). If anything, diplomats 
can enhance refl exivity about the modes at play 
in climate governance, and thereby help to build a 
more broadly shared acknowledgment of environ-
mental governance as a problem strongly related 
to pluralism. 
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Notes
1 ‘Science’ is understood broadly here and encompasses not only the natural sciences, but also engineer-
ing, economics, social sciences, and the humanities.
2 In Latourian (2013) terms (see below) one could say that these co-chairs embody a ‘crossing’ of the mode 
of reference [REF] and the mode of politics [POL]. They have to speak well in both modes and are always 
at risk of being understood in the wrong key.
3 All modes used in this paper are based on Latour (2013). 
4 While in practice specialists typically do not receive any comments from high-level civil servants or min-
isters on the governmental instruction, one way political awareness did trickle through in the Dutch 
instructions for the Fifth Assessment cycle was their emphasis on requiring suffi  cient underpinning of 
summary conclusions in the underlying report, in order to prevent political criticism on the IPCC’s quality 
assurance procedures. Thus, for political reasons [POL], the way summary conclusions reference underly-
ing text [REF] had becomes even more salient. See also Meyer and Petersen (2010).
5 Crossings discussed below follow the same formatting.
6 The IPCC takes all these sciences together under the mode of reference [REF]. Note that Latour (2013) 
does not categorize economics under this mode, nor would he categorize humanities subjects such as 
ethics under it.
